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The Human Rights Act in contemporary context 
HFL EN FENVti'1C: K, R0 G ER MA ST ERM AN 
ANI) GAVIN PHILLIPSON 
Introduction 
A number of commentators have pointed out that the inception of Bills 
of Rights tends to have the effect, as in Canada, of requiring courts to 
grapple with justifications for rights and freedoms, taking a more phi- 
losophical approach to legal reasoning as they attempt to resolve con- 
flicts between individual rights and competing societal and individual 
interests. ' When countries adopt a document setting out a list of human 
rights with special constitutional status (`a Bill of Rights"), the effect on 
judicial reasoning tends to be dramatic - as it was in Canada when it 
adopted the Charter of Rights. In 2000, the Human Rights Act came into 
force 
- affording the European Convention on Human Rights 
further 
effect in domestic law - and, while it does not have the entrenched status 
of other Bills of Rights, there is agreement that it does have what 
`constitutional' status UK law allows. 
Academics and lawyers agree that the introduction of the Act was one 
of the most significant developments in the public law field in the last 
100 years. The Act did not create a home-grown Bill of Rights for the 
UK; instead, it gave further legal effect to the European Convention on 
Human Rights. Thus, its impact on judicial reasoning was less predict- 
able than was the case in the broadly equivalent situation in Canada. 
This requires a word of explanation, since at first sight the effect on 
judicial reasoning in the UK was more predictable since the judges could 
See e. g. R. I. Sharpe, `The Impact of a Bill of Rights on the Role of the Judiciary: 
A Canadian Perspective' and M. [)arrow and P. Alston, `Bills of Rights in Comparative 
Perspective', both in P. Alston (ed. ), Promoting Human Rights Through Bills of Rights: 
Comparative Perspectives (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). 
Thoburn v. Sunderland City Council (20031 QB 151, para. 6?. See also Brown v. Stott 
20031 1 AC 681,703, ner Lord Bineham. 
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rely on an already large and developed body of jurisprudence interpret- 
ing the Convention - that of the European Court of Human Rights (and 
previously the Commission) at Strasbourg. But judicial receptivity to 
the ECHR under the Human Rights Act was less consistent than was 
the case in Canada: broadly speaking, the Canadian judges gave the 
Charter quite a warm reception, given the widespread popular support 
for its adoption, whereas, among British judges, some resistance to the 
Convention was evident. 3 The judges had become accustomed to the 
Convention as an international instrument, while at the same time they 
were proud of their long-established common law and constitutional 
traditions, including deference to parliament and to the executive in 
judicial review cases, as manifested in the Wednesbury doctrine. 4 Many 
of them appeared to take the view that the common law was already 
providing an effective protection for human rights - and could continue 
to develop in ways that would strengthen the protection., Indeed, a 
number of judges continue to take this view, and it is possible to discern 
further developments in a common law human rights tradition, running 
parallel to the HRA and engaging in an uneasy and uncertain relation- 
ship with it. This resistance to the Convention can be noted in parti- 
cular, albeit to varying degrees, in the chapters in the book by Gavin 
Phillipson, ' Ian Leigh, Sonia Harris-Short and Paul Roberts. There 
is thus a certain ambivalence in the attitude of the judiciary to the 
HRA, 8 which is not paralleled in Canada where there is a patriotic 
For example, Lord McCluskey -a long-term opponent of incorporation (see J. H. McCluskey, 
7 )) - wrote in Scotland on Last, Justice and Democracy (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 198 
Sunday )6 February 2000) that the Act would he a `field day for crackpots, a pain in the 
neck for judges and legislators and a goldmine for lawyers'. Buxton LI's article, written 
prior to the coming into force of the HRA, and attempting to refute the notion that it would 
have any impact on private law may also he seen as evidence of resistance to it, at least in 
that particular arena: see 'The Human Rights Act and Private Law' (2000) 116 LQR 48. 
I 
' See Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v. Wedneshury Corporation 119481 1 KB 223. 
See Sir John Laws, `Is the High Court the Guardian of Fundamental Human Rights? ' 
119931 PL 57. 
See e. g. the judgment of Laws LJ in R. (ProLife Alliance) v. BBC [20021 2 All ER 756, 
which is based largely on common law reasoning. Lord Woolfs comments in Attorney 
General's Reference (Ni). I of 2004) 1200412 Cr App R 27, para. 14, that `Article 6 does no 
more than reflect the requirements of fairness which have long been a part of English 
law', are also apposite. 
That is, his chapter on horizontal effect, Chapter 6. 
In spite of the frequent reminders that UK officials played a major part in drafting the 
ECHR and, for example, Jack Straw's reminder that it is `[a] classical statement of what 
British people have taken for granted as their rights in relation to the state' (Joint 
Committee on Human Rights, Minutes of Evidence, 14 March 2001, Q3). 
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attachment among the judiciary, the people and policy-makers to the 
Charter as a home-grown, specifically Canadian achievement. As Peter 
Hogg has put it: 
[The Charter's] adoption in 1982 was the product of a widespread public 
debate, in which the inevitable risks of judicial review played a prominent 
role. Admittedly, the Charter was never put to and approved by a popular 
referendum, but it has always commanded widespread popular support. 
A poll taken in 1999, on the heels of two controversial Charter decisions 
by the Supreme Court of Canada, showed 82 per cent of those polled 
saying that the Charter was `a good thing', and 61 per cent saying that the 
courts, not the legislatures, should have the last word when the courts 
decide that a law is unconstitutional. `' 
In contrast, the lack of solidly based political and popular support for 
the HRA is quite possibly also something which affects judicial 
responses to it. To say that popular backing for the HRA does not 
reach that evident in relation to the Canadian Charter or, for example, 
the Scotland Act, passed after a referendum, is to understate the mat- 
ter. "' Indeed, at the time of completing this Introduction, the HRA is in 
the midst of a firestorm of criticism, coming not only from the Prime 
Minister, but also from the main Opposition party, and Britain's most 
popular newspaper, The Sun, which has launched a campaign for the 
repeal of the HRA, " with, it claims, 35,000 readers giving immediate 
support. '` Tony Blair appears to be increasingly frustrated with the 
constraints upon deporting foreign prisoners and terrorist suspects 
imposed by Article 3.13 The leader of the main Opposition party, 
David Cameron, having pledged that the Conservatives would `scrap, 
9 
In 
ii 
12 
P. Hogg, 'The Charter Revolution: Is It Undemocratic? ' (2002) 12 Constitutional Foruw 
I (footnotes omitted). For a more sceptical view, see F. L. Morton and R. Knopff, 
Charter Revolution and the Court Party (Peterborough: Broadview Press, 2000). 
One commentator -a long-standing advocate of domestic human rights legislation - has 
welcomed the discussions which will he prompted by the Conservative's 'British Bill of 
Rights' initiative as the Human Rights Act has - 'in the absence of prior consultation' - 
'failed to attract sufficient symbolic significance to become embedded in the national 
consciousness' (Francesca Klug, 'Enshrine These Rights', Guardian, 27 June 2006; and letter 
to the Ohsen'er, 'Parliament -A Danger to Freedom', 9 April 2006). 
See its 'Leader' of 15 May 2006: 'At last Tony Blair admits he needs to do something about the 
ludicrous Human Rights Act. He wants the Government to have the power to overturn 
judges' barmy rulings where a criminal's so-called rights come ahead of their victim's. The 
PM says this is one of his "most urgent policy tasks He's not kidding ... 
Rest assured, The 
Sun will continue to fight for the scrapping of this disgraceful piece of legislation. ' 
www. thesun. co. uk/article/O.. 2-2006220181.00. html '; See n. 18 below. 
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reform or replace' the Act, ' 4 repeating the manifesto pledge they gave at 
the 2005 General Election, announced, as one of his first solid policy 
pledges since becoming leader that the Conservatives now sought to 
repeal the Act and replace it with a British Bill of Rights; " the reform 
appears to be aimed at least in part at freeing the government from some 
of the more `inconvenient' requirements of the Convention'6 thought to 
be hampering the `war on terror' and the fight against crime. It is clear 
that Mr Cameron regards this is a popular stance: it is fair to say that the 
attack on the HRA in the pages of certain best-selling newspapers, 
particularly recently, has been quite relentless, and filled with damaging 
myths and misconceptions. 
Certainly, the HRA currently exists in a climate very different from that 
prevailing in 2000. We no longer feel that we are at the beginning of a new 
dawn for civil liberties in the UK. The emphasis of policy-makers is often no 
longer on the benefits of the HRA; the post-9/ 11 debate tends to concern 
methods of avoiding its effects. Thus, the current Labour government 
derogated from Article 5 between 2001 and 2005,1' and has actively floated 
the possibility of withdrawal from the ECHR, followed by re-entry, but with 
a reservation in relation to the Chahal's principle deriving from Article 3, 
which the government claims is hindering its fight against international 
terrorism. '9 Tony Blair, in an open letter to the new Home Secretary, John 
Reid, spoke of the need to `look again at whether primary legislation is 
needed to address the issue of court rulings which overrule the Government 
14 See 'Cameron Calls for Repeal of Human Rights Act', Guardian, 12 May 2006. 
Announced in a speech to the Centre for Policy Studies, 26 tune 2006. The full text can be 
found at 57 2&speeches=1. 
The proposed reform has been widely criticised as incoherent and contradictory, partly 
because the Conservatives do not propose that the UK withdraw from the ECHR itself. 
Michael Mansfield QC has described it as 'totally misconceived and tabloid driven'. See 
'Tories Bill of Rights Bill Slammed', news. hhc. co. uk/ 1 /hi/uk_politics/51 15912. stm. 
Human Rights Act (Designated Derogation) Order 2001, SI 2001 No. 3644: this was 
enacted in order to allow Parliament to pass Part IV of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and 
Security Bill, allowing for detention without trial of foreign terrorist suspects. 
Chahalv. United Kingdom (1996) 23 EH RR 413. That is, the principle that a signatory to 
the ECHR is not only prohibited from directly inflicting treatment contrary to Article 3, 
but may not deport a person to a country where there is a real risk of such treatment. 
The government has considered at various points the idea of either denouncing the 
Convention and re-entering it while entering a reservation to Article 3, so that it can 
deport suspects to countries despite a risk of torture; it also suggested introducing 
legislation directing judges how to interpret Article 3 so that they would prioritise 
national security over individual rights in this context: for an analysis, see A. Lester and 
K. Beattie, `Risking Torture' 120051 EHRLR 265. 
I, 
Ih 
i- 
is 
14 
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in a way that is inconsistent with other EU countries' interpretation of the 
European Convention on Human Rights'. 20 The desire to free the executive 
from the handcuffs of human rights principles may be seen at present most 
vividly in the Government's attempt to have the Chahal principle over- 
turned at Strasbourg, 21 so that it will be able to deport suspected terrorists 
even to countries where there is a risk of their being subject to torture. 2" 
Amongst commentators also, there is doubt not only as to the basic desir- 
ability of incorporation of the Convention, 23 but more importantly as to the 
approach that should be taken to its interpretation, in terms of the balance 
to be struck between the power of the judiciary and that of Parliament and 
the executive. 24 It is plausible to suggest that this lack of popular support 
may affect the attitude of the judiciary - there may be some awareness 
among them of the fact that, if they adopt too expansive an approach to 
interpreting and enforcing the HRA, it might be radically modified or even 
repealed. It is impossible to tell whether the current storm of criticism 
surrounding the Act is mere journalistic and Westminster froth, which 
will evaporate in a few weeks or months, leaving judicial attitudes 
untouched: the Prime Minister's calls for a `profound rebalancing of the 
civil liberties debate )25 certainly suggests that he sees this issue as a serious 
policy priority, rather than just short-term populist rhetoric. 26 
'u 
1 
22 
23 
24 
26 
See `Blair Stung into Review of Human Rights Law', Telegraph, 15 May 2006. 
Confidence in the Prime Minister's loyalty to the Convention and the HRA is not 
inspired by this seeming blunder of confusing the Council of Europe with the European 
Union. 
For recent discussion, see the 19th Report of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, HL 
185 I/HC 701-1 (2005-6), at paras. 19-27. 
The government is intervening in a case brought against Holland: Ramzy v. Netherlands, 
No. 25424/05. 
See e. g. C. A. Geartv and K. I). Ewing, `Rocky Foundations for Labour's New Rights' 
(1997) EHRLR 146. Gearty has since modified his position to one which endorses the 
HRA, provided it is read in the way he suggests in n. 30 below. 
See n. 30 below. 
See `PM Calls for "Rebalancing" of Civil Liberties Debate', Guardian, 15 May 2006. 
His Lord Chancellor, Lord Falconer, has been much more circumspect and, indeed, has 
said that the UK will not withdraw from the Convention, nor scrap the HRA; he has 
admitted the possibility that it could be amended `if necessary', though his preferred 
course seems to he to educate judges and others as to its proper construction: see 
`Human Rights Act Will Not Be Axed, Says Falconer', Independent, 15 May 2006. His 
2006 review of the HRA, completed after the immediate firestorm of criticism around it 
had dissipated, amounted to a strong defence of it: Review of the Implementation of tht 
Human Rights Act, Department for Constitutional Affairs, http: //www. dca. gov. uki 
peoples- right s/human-rights/pdf/full_review. pdf. 
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The HRA project: problems, complexities 
and judicial responses 
In addition to the somewhat precarious political position of the HRA, 
this book as a whole sets out to show that the position of the UK in 
relation to the ECHR under the H RA does not parallel the position in 
jurisdictions such as Canada, for a number of other important reasons. 
The application of the ECHR via the HRA is highly problematic on a 
number of levels. Strasbourg's jurisprudence is often notably under- 
theorised. The reasoning is frequently brief, and lacking in rigour. In 
particular, the effects of the doctrine of the margin of appreciation result 
in some decisions in an almost complete failure to examine in any 
meaningful way the proportionality of restrictions upon individual 
rights adopted by states. ` Great variation in the intensity of review 
may be discerned; indeed, no single account of proportionality can he 
derived from the Strasbourg Jurisprudence . 
2s The purpose of the 
Strasbourg system is to provide a basic level of protection for human 
rights -a `floor' not a `ceiling' of rights - across a vast and disparate 
geographical area, one with hugely differing cultural sensitivities and 
governmental concerns. It is important, therefore, to be realistic about 
the limitations of the Strasbourg jurisprudence, lest it be thought that its 
`application' in English law can cure all our current ills in human rights 
terms. Indeed, importation of the case-law without a keen awareness of 
its limitations, in particular the effect of the margin of appreciation 
doctrine, can actually have the effect of legitimising areas of law that 
were previously seen as increasingly untenable; Certainly, application 
of the Strasbourg jurisprudence simpliciter, will not by itself necessarily 
result in a rights-driven reform of UK law. 
,- 
29 
29 
Notorious examples are Müller v. Switzerland ( 1991) 13 EHRR 212 and Otto- I)re?? 11'? Igt, r 
v. Austria ( 1994) 19 EHRR 34. 
For general discussion, see C. Gearty, Principles of Human Rights Adjudication (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2003); 1. Rivers, `Proportionality and Variable Intensity of 
Review' (2006) 65(1) CU 174-207. In the context of Article 10, see also G. Phillipson 
and H. Fenwick, . 'Media Freedom under the Human Rights Act (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, _2006), 
Chapter 2. 
An example would be the finding by Strasbourg (in Wingrovt' v. UK ( 1996) 24 EHRR 1) 
that the UK law of blasphemy does not violate the Convention, despite its openly 
discriminatory nature and its lack of either a public good defence or a requirement of 
specific intent; this gives an appearance of human rights respectability to the offence, 
allowing the government to claim that it is Convention-compliant, and does not 
therefore reauire reform or abolition. 
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It is also the case that, in addition to the difficulties inherent in the 
Strasbourg jurisprudence, the HRA itself is highly problematic. Intense 
normative and doctrinal debate continues around the balance to be 
struck between the enhanced power of the judiciary under the Act and 
that of Parliament and the executive. 30 The Act is also analytically and 
doctrinally ambiguous in some key areas - those of horizontal effect, 
31 
the ambit of s. 3(1) 32 and the public authority definition33 in particular. 
These points are explored in greater detail in subsequent chapters of this 
book, but, briefly, the HRA, as an incorporating instrument, gives rise to 
interpretative difficulties on a number of levels. First of all, there is the 
need to interpret the Strasbourg jurisprudence itself, to draw out the 
principles to be applied, by no means an easy task in many instances, 
given the characteristics of that jurisprudence described above. 
Secondly, there is sometimes a question whether to apply the case-law 
in domestic law at all: it is non-binding and there may be arguments in 
particular cases that it should not be followed. 34 These issues are 
explored in detail by Roger Masterman in Chapter 3, but, in brief, a 
particular problem may arise where a Strasbourg decision follows and 
ill 
tj 
ii 
14 
Thus, Professor Gearty has argued for an approach to the HRA which maximises those 
aspects of it which preserve both the unfettered sovereignty of Parliament and a mea- 
sure of discretion of the executive in relation to human rights issues: see his Principles 
of Human Rights Adjudication (Oxford: Oxford University Press, -1003). 
For his 
most recent contribution, see Can Human Rights Survive? (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006), Chapter 3. See also T. Campbell, 'Incorporation through 
Interpretation', in T. Campbell, K. 1). Ewing and A. Tomkins (eds. ), Sceptical Essays 
on Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); Lord Steyn, 'Deference: 
A Tangled Story' (2005] P1.346; J. Lowell, 'Judicial Deference: Servility, Civility or 
Institutional Capacity? ' (20041 PL 592; R. Edwards, 'Judicial Deference under the 
Human Rights Act' (2002) 65 MLR 859; F. Klug, 'Judicial Deference under the 
Human Rights Act' (2003] EHRLR 125; T. Hickman, 'Constitutional Dialogue, 
Constitutional Theories and the Human Rights Act 1998' 120051 PL 306; 
C. O'Cinneide, 'Democracy and Rights: New Directions in the Human Rights Era' 
(2004) 57 Current Legal Problems 175; D. Nicol, 'The Human Rights Act and the 
Politicians' (2004) 24(3) LS 451; 1). Nicol, 'Are Convention Rights a No-Go Zone for 
Parliament? ' (2002 ] PL 438-48. 
See Chapter 6.32 See Chapters 3 and 4. 
For criticisms of the judicial approach to this issue so far, see the Joint Committee on 
Human Rights, 'The Meaning of Public Authority under the Human Rights Act', HC 
382, HL 39 (2003-4); H. Quane, 'The Strasbourg Jurisprudence and the Meaning of a 
"Public Authority" under the Human Rights Act' (2006] PL 106. 
Under s. 2(1) HRA, it must be taken into account, but is not binding. See further 
R. Masterman, 'Taking the Strasbourg Jurisprudence into Account: Developing a 
"Municipal Law of Human Rights" under the Human Rights' Act' (2005) 54 ICLQ 907. 
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appears to contradict a decision of an appellate court on the same point 
of interpretation of Convention articles. As discussed by Gavin 
Phillipson in Chapter 9, precisely this problem is raised in relation to 
the crucial decision on privacy in Von Hannover v. Germany, 35 which 
immediately followed, and appears inconsistent in some respects with, 
the decision of the House of Lords in Campbell v. MGN Ltd. 36 A further 
potential clash became evident in relation to the House of Lords deci- 
sion in Qazi, 37 on the scope of Article 8, which was rapidly contradicted 
on point by the decision of the Strasbourg court in Connors v. United 
Kingdom. 38 The question in subsequent litigation39 was whether a lower 
court should follow the potentially incompatible House of Lords deci- 
sion, or whether that court might be discharged from applying strict 
rules of precedent due to the possible conflict with more recent 
Strasbourg authority. The House of Lords ruled that lower courts 
remained bound to follow the precedents set by the Appellate 
Committee. 40 Thirdly, even if agreement can be reached as to the 
principles to be applied from the Strasbourg jurisprudence, there is 
still the vexed question as to the extent that the courts should defer to 
a `discretionary area of judgment', enjoyed by the executive and/or 
Parliament, and as to its relation, (if any) with the international law 
doctrine of the margin of appreciation, an issue discussed further by Ian 
Leigh in Chapter 7. If the area of law in question is common law 
governing private relations, the role of the Convention rights remains 
unclear . 
41 Finally, if dealing with a statute, there is the question whether 
its wording and overall scheme allows the courts to change its inter- 
pretation to achieve compliance, or whether instead a declaration of 
incompatibility should be made. This involves determining the scope of 
s. 3(1) HRA, the crucial duty to interpret legislation compatibly with the 
Convention rights, if possible. As discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, the 
proper approach to this provision has given rise to a great deal of 
academic and judicial disagreement. Even where the judges agree in 
deciding that existing domestic law is incompatible as it stands, there 
ýi 
[2004 1 EMLR 21.3h [2004] 2 AC 457. 
Harrow London Borough Council v. Qazi ( 20041 1 AC 983 (H L). 
(2004) 40 EH RR 189. 
Leeds City Council v. Price and Others (2005] 1 WLR 1825. 
Kay and Others v. Lambeth London Borough Council; Price v. Leeds City Council 120061 
UKHL 10; (2006] 2 WLR 570. On which, see the discussion in Chapter 14, pp. 437-40. 
As discussed further in Chanter 6. 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
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still remains the question of the extent to which it needs to change in 
order to become compatible. '` 
We would therefore suggest that the HRA, through these layers of 
complexity, allows the judges plenty of scope to adopt either an `activist' 
or `minimalist' approach to judicial reform of domestic law: 43 broadly 
speaking, the latter would seek merely to achieve minimal compliance 
with the Strasbourg case-law; the former would seek to build upon it, 
and deploy more general Convention principles, in order to construct 
something much more like a Bill of Rights approach. Moreover, while 
the former approach would tend to emphasise deference to the role of 
Parliament and the executive, the latter would tend to exhibit a more 
muscular and expansive conception of the judicial role under the Act. 
As observed above, different levels of enthusiasm are discernible 
towards the HRA by different members of the judiciary. It might appear 
possible therefore to place the senior judges in two different `camps', 
depending on their attitude to the HRA - broadly the minimalist and 
activist camps. In fact, it is not possible to discern a neat polarisation 
between them, although some broad trends are evident. As the book 
indicates, certain senior members of the judiciary have been activist in 
one context but minimalist in another. For example, Lord Hoffmann's 
strikingly activist approach in the Belmarsh case, 44 in which he was 
prepared, alone amongst a seven-strong panel, to find that there was 
no `state of emergency threatening the life of the nation' in the UK, 
differed markedly from the much-criticised45 minimalist and deferential 
posture he adopted in Prolife Alliance. 46 
The above remarks are intended to indicate the main issues that this 
book seeks to address. It seeks to encapsulate, at this early point in the 
post-HRA era, after it has been in force for six years, the interaction that 
is occurring between the Convention rights and sometimes repressive 
legislation, between the rights and the common law and indeed between 
the rights and a more developed version of themselves -a nascent Bill of 
42 
See e. g. A. Kavanagh, `Statutory Interpretation and Human Rights After Anderson: A 
More Contextual Approach' [2004] PL 537. 
Generally, contrast the viewpoints taken in Chapters 2 and 3. 
A (FC) and Others (FC) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department; X (FC) and 
Another (FC) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] l'KHL 56. 
For an unusual instance of direct criticism by a fellow Law Lord, see Lord Stevn, 
`Deference: A Tangled Story' [2005] PL 346; see also J. Dowell, `Judicial Deference: 
Servility, Civility or Institutional Capacity? ' [20041 PL 592. 
Prol. ife Alliance v. BBC [ 2004] 1 AC 1 SS (HL). 
43 
44 
4S 
46 
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Rights based upon, but going further than, the Convention as inter- 
preted at Strasbourg. If the HRA is to be utilised to create such a Bill 
of Rights, judges will have to look beyond the often meagre and 
un-theorised Convention jurisprudence in doing so. 47 The book thus 
focuses on both content and process since it considers changes in the 
substantive law and the new processes of judicial reasoning being 
adopted. Thus it asks: which strategies of judicial reasoning are the 
judges adopting under the Act? Are the judges responding to the Act in 
a minimalist fashion - which is arguably all that the European Convention 
demands? Or are they using the Act to create - in effect -a domestic Bill 
of Rights? 
The judiciary at present shows, albeit in a patchy, inconsistent man- 
ner, some signs of taking the view that the HRA authorises the UK courts 
to develop their own approach to the interpretation and application of 
the Act in a manner that promotes Convention rights rather than merely 
respects them. The book will seek to determine whether these early signs 
indicate a deeper trend. If at least some of the judges see the HRA as 
more than simply a Convention implementation Act, how do they 
regard it? Are the standards of the Convention to be regarded as a 
domestic Bill of Rights to be given a national gloss, through a `constitu- 
tional' approach to interpretation? Since there might be complications if 
this were the case, is the effect collateral in the sense that it will inspire 
the development of an indigenous, informal Bill of Rights? On the basis 
that the `Bill of Rights' approach to the HRA has at least some support 
amongst certain members of the senior judiciary as the proper one, 
experience elsewhere suggests the need for some grounding for the 
whole process in which the courts are engaged -a shared understanding 
of the enterprise in which the judges are involved. This book sets out to 
make a contribution to providing that grounding. It also seeks to point 
up the areas in which the judiciary, through the resistance they are 
exhibiting to a thorough and clear-cut acceptance of the interpolation 
of Convention standards into areas of law which they themselves have 
constructed, are, in effect, preserving a wide measure of discretion as to 
how great a role to give to Convention standards in individual cases: the 
case studies examining the judicial attitude towards horizontal effect48 
47 
49 
As one of the authors has argued elsewhere: R. Masterman, `Taking the Strasbourg 
Jurisprudence into Account: Developing a "Municipal Law of Human Rights" under the 
Human Rights Act' (2005) 54 ICLQ 907. 
In Charter 6. 
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and the Wednesbury/proportionality debate49 illuminate this tendency 
particularly clearly. 
The book, we hope, is well placed to tackle these questions because it 
arose out of a project which was specifically intended to bridge the gap 
between academics and the profession. While the papers given at the 
seminars and conference5° covered specific areas of substantive law, 
they all set out to identify the principles and themes evident in judicial 
reasoning related to the HRA in a cross-cutting manner, and the con- 
tributions from the audience reflected that approach. The book therefore 
aims to identify the particular approach the judges are taking to reasoning 
under the HRA, regardless of the specific area under consideration. To 
this end, in Part I, it considers general Convention and HRA concepts 
since they arise across all areas of substantive law. It then proceeds in 
Part II to examine not only the use of such concepts in particular contexts, 
but also the modes of reasoning adopted as judges seek to straddle the 
divide between familiar common law and statutory concepts/doctrines 
and European ones. While cross-cutting themes emerge, it will also be 
found that there are interesting variations between substantive areas, due 
to particular judicial approaches that have become established in such 
areas, often for historical reasons. 
A number of chapters in Part II of the book, including in particular 
Chapters 2,7 and 13, look particularly at the extent to which the 
Convention rights are being afforded real efficacy in the face of a num- 
ber of recent legislative measures in the areas of criminal justice and 
immigration/national security. In order to declare such statutes com- 
patible with the Convention rights, it appears arguable in relation to some 
decisions that reliance is being placed on a minimalist interpretation 
of the Conventions 1 Thus, this book seeks to make the argument that at 
the beginning of the Human Rights Act era the danger of a decrease in 
state accountability and the creation of merely empty or tokenistic 
guarantees is apparent. However, in relation to uses of coercive state 
power, especially in the terrorism context, the judges have, in the 
Belmarsh decision, 52 discussed in Chapter 7, utilised the HRA to 
49 
51 
In Chapters 7 and 8.5" See the Preface, pp. xi-xiii. 
See e. g. the discussion of the judgment of Laws 1.1 in R (Limbuela) v. Secretary of State for 
the Home Department 120041 QB 1440; [2004] 3 WLR 561 (CA), by Cohn \\'arbrick in 
Chapter 2, pp. 46-51. 
A (FC) and Others (FC) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department; X (FC) and 
Another (FC) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department 120041 UKHL 56. For 
discussion of the discrimination issues raised by this case, see Chapter 12, pp. 366-9. 
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scrutinise executive decisions much more intensively than they felt 
themselves able to do previously: in that already famous judgment, the 
House of Lords declared the detention without trial regime put in place 
by Part IV of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 incom- 
patible with the Convention. However, as Conor Gearty has pointed 
out, the Law Lords may have felt able to take this stance due to the lack of 
a strike-down power in the HRA. The responsibility for setting free 
possible terrorists was ultimately (and formally) passed to the govern- 
ment and to Parliament, since under s. 4 HRA the legislation under 
which the men were held remained valid and of full effect, rendering 
their continued detention lawful, domestically: the executive was not 
forced to act. In Gearty's colourful phrase: '[The Law Lords'] liberal 
fingerprints would not be - could not be - the last to be found on these 
men should they be released; the Home Secretary's and/or Parliament's 
imprimatur would also have to be impressed. )53 The HRA was set up 
(under ss. 4,6(2) and 3(2)) in order to allow the government to rely on 
incompatible legislation - and this is of especial importance in relation 
to the use of coercive state power. Nevertheless, the decision is widely 
seen as one of the most significant affirmations of human rights by a UK 
court in recent times. 54 
In contrast, as Chapter 13 points out, the effect of the HRA in the 
criminal justice context has been muted and patchy. The book will set out 
to consider some of the reasons for this. It looks particularly at the extent 
to which the Convention is having real efficacy. This is a central concern of 
this book, since it argues that, in an era of heightened pressure on rights, 
there are dangers of a lower standard of protection for freedom than we 
had in the pre-Human Rights Act era. There is a danger that the Act will be 
utilised in Parliament to give the impression that a process of human rights 
auditing has occurred, stifling political discourse and obscuring the rights- 
abridging effects of legislation. Its effects may be marginalised due to the 
reduction or exclusion of judicial scrutiny which tends to accompany 
the provision of a statutory basis for interferences with rights in order to 
introduce further coercive state powers. This book seeks therefore, at this 
turning point for individual liberty in Britain, to make a contribution to 
the debate that is currently under way as to processes of judicial reasoning 
under the HRA. It argues for an understanding of the dangers of a 
53 
54 
C. Gearty, `Human Rights in an Age of Terrorism: Injurious, Irrelevant or 
Indispensable? ' (2005) 58 CLP 25,35. 
See e. g. ibid., p. 25. 
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minimalist interpretation of the Convention55 and for the full realisation 
in domestic law of its underlying principles. 
The structure of this book 
As has been indicated, although the genesis of this book lies in a research 
project conducted by the Human Rights Centre at the University of 
Durham, it should not be assumed that each chapter reflects a uniform 
interpretation of what the Human Rights Act is, does or, indeed, should 
be. Consequently, no wholly consistent argument regarding the pro- 
cesses of judicial reasoning under the Act can be found in what follows; 
each chapter reflects the particular view of its author. Many perspectives 
can be discerned from the works in this collection - to an extent, that is 
unsurprising; as a legislative rights instrument, the Human Rights Act 
remains at an early stage of what will hopefully be a long life (assuming 
the various threats to repeal, review or otherwise neuter the potential of 
the HRA are not forthcoming). 
This book is split into two parts. Part I, entitled `The Interpretation of 
the Human Rights Act', examines various facets of what might be called the 
technical aspects of reasoning under the Act: the status of the Act and the 
Strasbourg) urisprudence in domestic law, the interpretative obligations of 
courts and tribunals, the horizontal effects of the Act, the transition from 
Wednesbury review towards a more rigorous proportionality test and the 
constraints on the powers of the courts under the principle of deference to 
the elected arms of the state. It also asks fundamental questions about the 
role and purpose of the Act, in particular contrasting the views of Colin 
Warbrick and Roger Masterman. These themes of judicial creativity and 
restraint, and of confidence and uncertainty which emerge, are returned to 
in the chapters which form Part II, entitled `The Human Rights Act and 
Substantive Law'. Each chapter in Part II seeks to examine the effects of 
the HRA on a specific and discrete area of the law, namely, family 
law, discrimination law, criminal law, the development of a common law 
privacy remedy, and the process of balancing competing rights in the 
context of reporting restrictions on judicial proceedings. While Part I 
might be said to approach the HRA from a constitutional perspective, as 
Paul Roberts notes in his chapter, it `does not follow from its indubitably 
55 We include within this attempts by judges to reinterpret rights in a way which provides 
less protection than Strasbourg, and which is unsupported by any Strasbourg authority: 
see n. 51 above- 
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constitutional status that the exclusive, or even primary, juridical signifi- 
cance of the Human Rights Act must be located only in the self-consciously 
constitutional pronouncements of the highest courts'. `' Each of the chap- 
ters contained in Part II therefore attempts to prise out strands of reasoning 
as apparent in subject-specific areas of the law; they are case studies of 
judicial reasoning at the micro-level, in contrast to the macro-level analysis 
contained in Part I. 
The interpretation of the Human Rights Act 
The book begins with an international lawyer's perspective on the status of 
the Human Rights Act and of the role of domestic courts vis-ä-vis the 
Convention rights. Colin Warbrick's chapter begins with an analysis 
of what might be termed the `minimalist' approach to the status of the 
Convention in domestic law, examining whether the UK courts can he said 
to be discharging their obligation of giving faithful effect to the Convention 
case-law in a number of controversial areas. Professor Warhrick explains 
the nature of the Convention system and why the co-operation of all organs 
of the state is vital for its operation. The chapter then examines recent UK 
cases which have addressed the formal and substantive questions of what 
rights are `Convention rights' for the HRA and what is required of states by 
`Convention rights'. It concludes that these decisions show a proper regard 
for the demands of the principle of co-operation between UK law and the 
law of the ECHR. The minimum task of judicial reasoning of HRA judg- 
ments is to show that the national court has adequately and accurately 
taken into account the formal and substantive aspects of `Convention 
rights' as understood by the European Court of Human Rights. 
In the context of the status given to the Strasbourg jurisprudence in 
domestic law under this requirement lying upon domestic courts, Roger 
Masterman examines judicial approaches to this obligation, which - during 
the Parliamentary debates on the Human Rights Bill - was seen as going to 
the heart of the question of whether the Act would amount to a domestic 
Bill of Rigfits. The obligation to `take into account' Strasbourg jurispru- 
dence is argued to have been approached in different ways by the judiciary; 
a number of leading House of Lords decisions point to an obligation to 
follow Strasbourg jurisprudence where it is `clear and constant', while other 
dicta points to the conclusion that this might he a more rigorous, and 
restricting, requirement than s. 2(1) on its face appears to require. These 
, Chapter 13, p. 378. 
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contrasting - although not entirely irreconcilable - interpretations of the 
status of Strasbourg jurisprudence post-HRA are argued to represent a 
conflict between the old order and the new, values of precedent and legal 
certainty versus ideas of constitutional adjudication and a realignment of 
the separation of powers. 
The interpretative obligation imposed on courts and tribunals by 
s. 3(1) of the HRA has spawned a huge range of academic analyses, 
befitting its status as a key provision of the Act. 5` Two of our contri- 
butors analyse s. 3(1) and its requirements from different perspectives. 
In his chapter, David Feldman continues the idea that the judicial role - 
and the techniques employed by judges - should be re-examined in the 
light of the HRA in the specific context of the obligation to `interpret' 
legislation compatibly with the Convention rights. Feldman explores 
the processes of `statutory interpretation' by way of s. 3( 1) HRA, work- 
ing from the proposition that `interpretation' is not only a question of 
the meaning of words in their statutory context, but a question of the 
effects or outcomes that those words may give rise to. D8 Against this 
backdrop, he proposes that the constitutional and institutional compe- 
tences of the various decision-makers required to make judgments 
under s. 3( 1) - whether they be judges, legislators or administrators - 
will necessarily shape the inquiry required of them by the HRA, and that 
without an appreciation of the myriad factors which might influence 
such decision-making we may not fully comprehend the requirements 
of s. 3( I) itself. 
Equally, the relationship between s. 3( 1) and the s. 4 ability of the 
judiciary to declare legislation incompatible with `the Convention 
rights' is also key to an understanding of the Human Rights Act as a 
whole. Using s. 3(1) may lead to what might be argued to be the effective 
rewriting of a statutory provision, 59 while recourse to s. 4 defers to the 
57 
See e. g. C. Gearty, `Reconciling Parliamentary Democracy and Human Rights' (2002) 
118 LQR 248; G. Phillipson, `(Mis-)Reading Section 3 of the Human Rights Act' (2003) 
119 LQR 183; C. Gearty, `Revisiting Section 3 of the Human Rights Act' (2e03) 119 LQR 
551; A. Kavanagh, `The Elusive Divide between Interpretation and Legislation under the 
Human Rights Act 1998' (2004) 24 OILS 259; D. Nicol, `Statutory Interpretation and 
Human Rights after Anderson' [2004] PL 274; A. Kavanagh, `Statutory Interpretation 
and Human Rights after Anderson: A More Contextual Approach' [2004] PL 537; 
A. Kavanagh, `Unlocking the Human Rights Act: The "Radical" Approach to Section 
3(1) Revisited' [2005] EHRLR 259. 
A point endorsed in Aileen Kavanagh's discussion of Bellinger v. Bellinger [2003] 2 AC 
467 (HL) in Chapter 5, pp. 128-9. 
See e. g. R v. A (No. 2) 120021 1 AC 45. 
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enacted intention of Parliament in the legislation in question; the choice 
the judiciary are faced with may be seen as analogous to as a choice 
between `juristocracy' and Parliamentary democracy. 60 In her examina- 
tion of the relationship between ss. 3 and 4 of the Act, Aileen Kavanagh 
emphasises - in line with David Feldman - that we should not simply 
conceive of s. 3(1) in terms of finding an interpretation which is linguis- 
tically possible. Basing her reasoning on the decision of the House of 
Lords in Ghaidan v. Godin-Mendoza, Kavanagh suggests that `the choice 
between sections 3 and 4 involves a much broader evaluative decision 
requiring an assessment of the limits of judicial law-making in the 
context of a particular case'. ' But does this amount to a sea-change in 
the process of judicial reasoning? Kavanagh argues that it does not. 
Comparing Ghaidan with the pre-HRA decision of Fitzpatrick v. 
Sterling Housing Association Ltd, 62 this chapter concludes by finding 
that it is not the methods of judicial reasoning that have changed, but 
the judiciary's willingness - in the appropriate case - to utilise those 
methods in a more creative manner. Dr Kavanagh also stresses the 
broad, contextual approach that the courts have taken to s. 3(1), in 
which a wide range of factors is considered in deciding whether to 
reinterpret a statutory provisioq using that section. While this is an 
approach with which she personally agrees, 63 it may be noted that it is 
also one which maximises judicial discretion in relation to the use of 
s. 3(1), a theme which reoccurs in a number of other chapters in this book. 
Prior to the implementation of the HRA, the potential horizontal 
effect of the Act was a matter of some controversy. Some saw the Act as 
the catalyst for the creative development of common law doctrines to 
ensure that full effect was given to Convention rights64 in the face of 
significant loci of private power; others saw it as a mechanism which 
would allow private citizens to assert Convention rights independently 
of a pre-existing cause of action, 65 others still as a distortion of the 
Convention's role as between the individual and the state. 66 In chapter 6, 
60 
61 
63 
64 
65 
66 
K. D. Ewing, `The Bill of Rights Debate: Democracy or Juristocracy in Britain? ', in 
K. D. Ewing, C. A. Gearty and B. Hepple, Human Rights and Labour Law (London: 
Mansell, 1994). 
See Chapter 5, p. 141.62 120011 1 AC 27. 
See her `Statutory Interpretation and Human Rights after Anderson: A More Contextual 
Approach' 120041 PL 537. 
M. Hunt, `The "Horizontal Effect" of the Human Rights Act' 119981 PL 423. 
H. W. R. Wade, `Horizons of Horizontality' (2000) 116 LQR 217. 
R. Buxton, `The Human Rights Act and Private Law' (2000) 116 LQR 48. 
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Gavin Phillipson argues that this area of reasoning is marked by a 
judicial failure to engage effectively with the theoretical and practical 
justifications for this use of the Convention rights and their accompany- 
ing jurisprudence. Moreover, the judiciary has shown a marked and 
increasing preference to avoid resolving this issue at any general level, 
thus preserving effective judicial discretion in this area. Thus, one 
important question remains unanswered: as Phillipson argues; `the 
courts have left themselves the ability to bring Convention principles 
into private law, but have not fully accepted a position in which they are 
bound to act compatibly with them'. ' 
In his chapter, `The Standard of Review and Legal Reasoning after the 
Human Rights Act', Ian Leigh investigates emerging trends in judicial 
review decisions under the HRA. Two broad themes can be identified: 
expansionary tendencies which seek to engage with the Strasbourg 
jurisprudence to intensify the standard of review, and those which 
seek to limit or resist that expansion. In common with the preceding 
chapter, the under-theorised approach to the potential impact of the 
HRA is addressed in the context of the judicial review of administrative 
action through the effective reversion to the standards of Wednesbury 
review, the tendency to give variable weight to different rights, and the 
concept of `indirect deference' to Parliament. By contrast, Sir David 
Keene provides a judicial perspective on the concept of deference as 
applied under the Human Rights Act, endorsing the principles enun- 
ciated by Laws LJ in the case of International Transport Roth GmbH 
v. Secretary of State for the Home Department. "s This chapter emphati- 
cally endorses the notion that, in spite of the enthusiastic embrace of 
theoretical analysis of the Human Rights Act by the academic branch 
(particularly in its discussion of the concept of deference), " for the 
judiciary at least, charged with the task of applying principle in practice, 
there remains a vital sense of pragmatism. As Sir David notes in his 
h: 
69 
Chapter 6, p. 172.68 12002] 3 WLR 344,376-8. 
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chapter, citing Lord Steyn's speech in ex parte Daly, `in law context is 
everything'. 70 
The Hurnan Rights Act and substantive law 
The potential for domestic courts under the Human Rights Act to 
develop a remedy for invasions of personal privacy was one of the 
more controversial predicted effects of judicial reasoning under the Act. '' 
Indeed, in the first substantive, `privacy' case heard after the coming into 
effect of the Human Rights Act, one member of the Court of Appeal felt 
confident enough to assert that `we have reached a point at which it can be 
said with confidence that the law recognises and will appropriately protect a 
right of personal privacy'. ' `' The obvious contrast of this stance with the 
conservative approach adopted by the Court of Appeal in Kaye v. 
Robertson' 3 appears to demonstrate an enthusiastic embrace of the 
Convention standards in an area in which domestic law was widely argued 
to be lacking. And, despite subsequent courts' less than convincing endor- 
sements of Sedley LJ's dicta, '` Gavin Phillipson argues that the effect of 
the HRA on the common law doctrine of breach of confidence in the 
Campbell ', decision has been sl4ch that it can now be asserted that we 
have - in all but name -a tort of invasion of privacy. However, he goes on 
to suggest that this radical use of the Convention is in fact paradoxical: the 
House of Lords made vigorous use of it to develop breach of confidence 
into a new tort of misuse of private information, before there was even a 
clear Strasbourg precedent requiring such action. Von Hannover v. 
Germany'6 subsequently provided that precedent, but also appeared to 
expand the requirements of Article 8 beyond those catered for by 
Campbell. In response, Phillipson argues, the courts in subsequent cases 
have so far resolutely avoided recognition of this area of dissonance, let 
alone sought to address it - an example perhaps of both the ambivalence 
surrounding the importation of Strasbourg jurisprudence into the private 
70 
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common law, and the reluctance to revisit the decisions of superior courts 
in the light of subsequent Strasbourg judgments. 
In the succeeding chapter, Helen Fenwick continues this assessment 
of the courts' ability to effectively resolve issues of competing rights. As 
Sir David Keene indicates in his foreword to this work, the courts are 
accustomed to the task of `striking the balance between the public 
interest and individual rights'; the Human Rights Act changes the nature 
of this judicial inquiry in those cases where competing Convention 
rights are raised. Fenwick examines the emerging jurisprudence on 
conflicts of media free speech and the privacy of children, arguing that 
the results demonstrate the `contradictory nature' of much judicial 
decision-making under the Act which can be seen to `reveal ... a 
sophisticated understanding of the value of individual rights under the 
Convention' while simultaneously reflecting `the determination of 
judges to resist the HRA where a particular strand of consequentialist 
thinking has become entrenched in a field of law'. '' 
Sonia Harris-Short analyses the impact of the Human Rights Act in 
the sphere of family law. In the context of the regulation of intimate 
adult relationships and public and private law disputes concerning 
children, this chapter explores the initial, stunted, impact of the HRA 
in this area of the law. Of all those examined in this part of the book, 
adjudication in the family law field has been marked by a judicial 
reluctance to engage with the Convention rights, and with rights- 
based reasoning more generally. Two major reasons are advanced 
for the minimal impact of the HRA in this field; first, a judicial and 
practitioner attachment to the domestic tradition which places the 
welfare principle and the concept of the family unit at its core, a frame- 
work which is felt to be threatened by the potential adoption of more 
`individualistic' human rights standards. 78 Secondly, this initial reluc- 
tance to engage with Convention standards is compounded by the fact 
that family law cases frequently engage sensitive issues of public policy 
and resource allocation, issues which under the separation of powers 
are - rightly or wrongly - traditionally regarded as the domain of 
See Chapter 10, p. 304. This latter point is also drawn out by the analyses of Sonia 
Harris-Short and Paul Roberts in their respective chapters. 
'x Similar themes arise in Paul Robert's chapter, which also notes the judicial attachment 
to existing domestic standards as a potential reason for domestic courts failing to engage 
properly with Strasbourg. 
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Parliament, and not of the courts. 79 The tensions described in Part I over 
the correct constitutional position and role of the courts in the emerging 
judicial human rights discourse are again therefore apparent at the 
micro-level, as the decision of the House of Lords in Bellinger v. 
Bellinger" amply illustrates. But, again, the dangers of attempting to 
extract any themes common to specific areas of law are apparent in this 
analysis as, by way of contrast with the decision in Bellinger, the House 
of Lords decision in Mendoza - again a case involving sensitive policy 
concerns - nevertheless provoked a `strong bout of judicial activism'. 
x' 
This largely cautious approach to the HRA and the Convention rights is 
echoed in the case-law arising out of disputes involving children - 
especially those governed by private law - where it is argued that, `whilst 
the poor quality of reasoning employed in these cases is disappointing, 
the concern of the judiciary at turning their back on the welfare 
approach is understandable, if essentially misplaced'. 82 
The changing nature of the judicial role is analysed further in Aaron 
Baker's chapter, `Article 14 ECHR: A Protector, Not a Prosecutor'. In 
common with chapters before and after, Baker highlights the tensions in 
judicial decisions as the courts come to terms with a new anti-discrimination 
provision. Particular attention is given to the - incorrect - assumption 
that Article 14 is `parasitic' and structural problems caused by this for 
the processes of reasoning in domestic discrimination cases. Further, 
Baker charts the courts' attempts to move towards the more victim- 
centred analysis required by Article 14 - an analysis which is again at 
odds with domestic law traditions in this field which require a focus to 
be placed on the reasons for a certain decision, rather than its effects. 83 
In Chapter 13, Paul Roberts analyses the presumption of innocence as 
a human right - an issue which has been the subject of considerable 
litigation in the appellate courts over recent years, and on which there 
appears to be very little in terms of judicial consensus. For that reason 
alone, Roberts argues, the concept of the presumption of innocence 
would be an apt case study on judicial reasoning in the post-HRA era; 
the issue is given further salience by the fact that, prior to the HRA, 
many of the points raised by appeals were considered well-settled issues 
of criminal procedure. Again therefore, the HRA can be seen as the 
79 See e. g. the discussion of Bellinger v. Bellinger, in Chapter 4, p. 122. 
"" 120031 2 AC 467. "' Chapter 11, p. 317. "Z Ibid., p. 346. 
83 A tension paralleled in the movements towards a more intensive standard of judicial 
review, discussed by Ian Leigh in Chapter 7, pp. 179-91. 
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catalyst for a questioning of existing domestic standards previously - 
and amongst some judges arguably stills4 - thought to provide satisfac- 
tory protection for `rights'. So, Roberts argues, the interface of domestic 
and European standards has brought about a `liberating effect' on 
judicial interpretation - one which extends beyond the apparent scope 
of Article 6 ECHR - but argues that judicial reasoning in this sphere has 
been blighted by conceptual uncertainty and a tendency towards 
`results-oriented reasoning' which threatens to hamper the coherent 
judicial articulation of the presumption of innocence. 
From the above, it will be seen that this book ranges widely over both 
procedural and substantive aspects of the H RA and its impact. We hope it 
will stimulate further thought and debate on this centrally important topic. 
! ca See n. 6 above. 
